Starting with Romer [1987] and Rivera-Batiz-Romer [1991] economists have been able to model how trade enhances growth through the creation and import of new varieties. In this framework, international trade increases economic output through two channels. First, trade raises productivity levels because producers gain access to new imported varieties. Second, increases in the number of varieties drives down the cost of innovation and results in ever more variety creation. Using highly disaggregate trade data, e.g. Gabon's imports of Gambian groundnuts, we structurally estimate the impact that new imports have had in approximately 4000 markets per country. We then move from groundnuts to globalization by building an exact TFP index that aggregates these micro gains to obtain an estimate of trade on productivity growth for each country. We find that in the typical country in the world, new imported varieties account for 10-25 percent of its productivity growth. However, when we structurally estimate the long-run impacts of these productivity growth effects, we find that import variety growth between
I. Introduction
Economists have long postulated that trade may raise growth. However, it was not until the work of Romer [1987] and Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991] that we had a general equilibrium model that would let us understand how trade might bring this about. While this seminal work has spawned the development of the vast endogenous growth literature, it has fallen short of taking these models to the data.
1 This paper is the first attempt to structurally estimate the impact that trade has on growth as suggested by the endogenous growth literature. To do this, we extend
Jones [1995] into a multi-country setting and use detailed data on the import of capital and intermediate goods across countries to estimate the impact that trade has on a country's productivity. Our results suggest that while trade has only temporary effects on a country's growth rate, the effects are persistent enough to imply large gains from trade. Our estimates suggest that about 10-25 percent of the typical country's per capita income growth can be attributed to international trade.
The methodology we employ differs quite sharply with that employed by most of the existing trade and growth literature. Prior work has tended to fall into two categories. Crosscountry growth regressions have used a "one regression fits all" approach that is quite vague about the precise mechanisms of how trade globalization affects growth. This has produced a skepticism about the robustness of the results and has led researchers to focus their attention on specific cases of liberalization. 2 These "micro-econometric studies" of particular sectors such as "groundnuts" have the advantage that they can provide rich and compelling econometric evidence of particular trade liberalizations. In the best examples, one can often be precise about the mechanisms through which trade affects growth. Their main disadvantage is that it is hard to extrapolate from groundnuts to globalization.
In this paper we use a hybrid approach to understanding how trade affects growth. By breaking world trade down into 6-digit bilateral import flows and estimating hundreds of structural parameters per country, we are able to build estimates that preserve the cross-industry richness of each country's economy. The estimation strategy we use enables us to combine all the gains from new and better imported goods in each industry to obtain aggregate implications for each country. We can use these estimates to account for the extent of productivity growth predicted by endogenous growth models and thereby can be precise about the channel through which trade affects growth.
A key aspect of endogenous growth models is that the introduction of new and better products drives productivity growth. Hence, we begin our exploration of the data by documenting that a defining characteristic of the growth of world trade over the last decade has been the import of new goods as well as existing goods from new sources of supply. 3 Analyzing 6-digit bilateral flows over the period 1994-2003, we show that for most countries in the world their trade to GDP ratio rose because they imported new goods not because they imported more of existing goods. In the typical developing country, virtually all of the growth in the ratio of imports to GDP came from the import of new varieties, and new varieties accounted for almost half of the growth. Moreover we show that there are far more trade flows than would be obtained in a world of homogeneous goods. Since countries are importing new goods and these goods are differentiated, this implies gains to productivity and welfare along the lines predicted by endogenous growth models.
In these models, opening to trade causes an immediate jump in per capita income as the access to new and higher quality intermediate inputs increases productivity. We use the empirical methodology of Feenstra and Markusen [1994] to show that we can measure this impact in a way consistent with Jones [1995] . In our calibration, the increase in the number of imported varieties observed over the last 10 years raised GDP per capita in the typical country in the world by 1-1.5
percent. The main intuition is that increasing the number of intermediate goods does not increase productivity much if new varieties are close substitutes to existing varieties or if the share of new 3 Our data lets us measure intermediate inputs quite precisely. To give an example from our data, we allow for 6 different types of groundnut products: e.g. shelled raw groundnuts, unshelled raw groundnuts, prepared groundnuts, etc. Data limitations force us to treat new imports of some -but not all -groundnut products symmetrically (e.g. shelled and unshelled raw groundnuts), but nonetheless we are able to structurally estimate four different demand parameters and four different supply parameters in the groundnut market per country. These parameters enable us to estimate how new imports of unshelled groundnuts affect each economy without making any restrictions that countries value raw groundnuts similarly or that liberalizing raw groundnuts is similar to liberalizing prepared groundnuts.
varieties is small relative to existing ones. For this reason, a crucial aspect of this calibration is the estimation of elasticities of substitution across different intermediate goods that are allowed to vary in each of the 73 countries studied in around 200 sectors. We apply methods developed in Feenstra [1994] and to estimate these structural parameters.
These models of endogenous growth also suggest that opening to trade can affect the growth rate of productivity. The wider access to imported intermediate goods means that R&D labor is more productive, which reduces the cost of generating new blueprints for intermediate products.
Whether this cost reduction is temporary or permanent is what distinguishes semiendogenous growth models from fully endogenous growth models. Under some reasonable assumptions we are able to quantify how persistent this reduction is by examining the growth in the set of exported varieties across countries. Using detailed export data to proxy for the new domestic goods in each country, we find that increasing the number of existing varieties only temporarily raises growth rates over their steady state level. We find the half-life of the impact of new goods on growth rates to be around 14 years.
Despite the fact that we find only a temporary increase of growth after an increase in the set of imported intermediate inputs, we show that the impact from the global rise in imported varieties in the last 10 years on future output growth is large. To see how much this would matter for welfare we can compare the present discounted value of per capita income with and without access to the foreign varieties to obtain a measure of how much permanent income rose as a result of the liberalization. Our results indicate that permanent income will ultimately rise by 28 percent in the median country as a result of these new varieties. Of this, only 1.3 percentage points are due to the immediate productivity gain arising from the import of new and better varieties (what we call below the "level effect," following Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991] ). In other words, semi-endogenous growth models suggest that there are very powerful growth effects due to trade liberalization that are ignored by conventional static analyses.
While no previous paper has structurally estimated the impact of trade on growth, our paper is related to a number of strands in the existing literature. First, in a survey of our understanding about growth, Easterly and Levine [2001] argue that "in the search for the secrets of long-run economic growth, a high priority should go to rigorously defining TFP, empirically dissecting it, and identifying the policies and institutions most conducive to its growth". Our 
II. The Growth in World Varieties
What is behind international growth in trade to GDP ratios? In order to answer this question, it will be useful to establish some terminology. We define an imported variety as a 6-digit Harmonized System (HS) product category from a particular country. To give an example drawn from our data, "raw, shelled groundnuts" is a product category, and "Gambian, raw, shelled groundnuts" is a variety. Obviously, counting categories and varieties can be problematic because new varieties may be lower or higher quality relative to existing ones. This is an issue that we will deal with in our econometric section, but it is still useful to have some sense of the changes in variety growth in the raw data.
In Table 1 , we present summary statistics for the 73 countries that reported 6-digit HS import data using the 1992 classification system in the United Nation's COMTRADE database for at least 5 years between 1994 and 2003. 4 We use the U.S. 1997 Benchmark Input-Output The change in the number of source countries per category is more striking. The median number of varieties imported by a country in our sample rose by 38 percent from 29,973 to 41,302 over the same time period. In order to assess the implications of this change for each importer, we first computed the average number of countries supplying each 6-digit import good and then computed the median across importers of these averages. In 1994, the typical country imported its goods from on average 7 suppliers. This indicates that only very few of the close to 200 potential exporters actually supplied a good into the typical importer's market. Between 1994 and 2003, however, the average number of suppliers of a good in the typical importer rose from 7.0 to 8.1, indicating that most countries experienced a substantial increase in the number of exporters supplying any given market. This 16 percent increase in the number of countries supplying the imports of a good to the typical country in combination with the rise in total number of varieties imported by the typical country, makes a prima facie case that the number of varieties entering most countries rose globally.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 portray this information graphically for the 73 countries in our sample.
We plot the final number of positive import categories (in logs) against the initial level (in logs)
in Figure 1 . The dashed line corresponds to the 45-degree line which indicates no growth in imported goods. Almost all countries experienced an increase in the number of goods imported, and those that experienced declines experienced only modest ones. The data indicate that there is 4 We initially had 79 countries, but we noticed some discrepancies between the COMTRADE data and the World Bank's World Development Indicators database (WDI) that made us not trust the data for a few countries. We dropped 4 countries (Costa Rica, Saint Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uganda) because the ratio of imports reported by COMTRADE relative to the WDI fluctuated by over 20 percent. We also dropped country years if the ratio of imports in the two databases differed by more than 50 percent. This eliminated Moldova and the Seychelles. 5 This rise occurred despite the fact that several HS categories were retired over this time period, which caused the total number of HS categories to fall slightly from 5,036 to 4,980.
a general increase in the number of goods imported. As one can see from the figure, countries that imported in a large set of products in 1994 had proportionally less growth in new goods than those in the rest of the sample.
This inverse relationship between growth in new goods and the initial level of goods with positive imports suggests two potential limitations of the data. First, even at the 6-digit level, most countries import most goods (and some countries import virtually all goods), so the scope for identifying variety growth through the new goods dimension is going to be limited. This is especially true for large countries that tend to import in virtually all categories. Second, the total number of existing product categories is bounded above. Statistical offices define goods categories based on the existing set of goods, not future goods. This means that if variety growth manifests itself in new goods, new varieties will initially be placed in the same categories as existing goods, and we will underestimate variety growth. African Republic, Malaysia and Uruguay. Moreover, this figure shows that import variety growth was a common feature of all countries in the sample during this period, despite the fact that some countries could not import in more categories.
A frequently cited stylized fact underlying our sense of increasing globalization is that trade to GDP ratios for most countries have been rising. Given the disaggregate nature of the data we use, we can understand the role played by new varieties of imports in this growth by conducting the following exercise. Let M ct be total imports into country c in time t. Let I cs be the set of positive bilateral import flows into country c in time s. It will also be useful to define M ct (I cs ) as the value of imports into country c of varieties that were also available in time s. Using these variables, we can decompose imports into a country according to the following equation:
(1)
where the first term corresponds to the imports of goods that were available in period t -1, and the second term corresponds to total imports in period t of goods that were not imported earlier.
If we define Y ct as the GDP of the country, we can rewrite equation (1) as
    
The left-hand side of equation (3) is the percentage change in the country's import to GDP ratio.
The terms on the right correspond to the contribution to this change by intensive import growth and extensive import growth. The growth in these new varieties would have little meaning if imports of the same good from different countries are perfect substitutes. One way to confirm whether goods at this level of aggregation are indeed differentiated is by testing a simple prediction by Dorfman, Samuelson and Solow [1958] . They argued that in a world in which goods are perfectly homogeneous and firms are perfectly competitive, one can model trade as a linear programming problem in which one minimizes trade costs subject to the constraint that one must satisfy every country's net offer of each good. With C countries in the world, Dorfman, Samuelson, and Solow show that the solution to any such minimization problem will entail no more than C -1 positive bilateral trade flows for any good. The intuition for this result is that if goods are homogeneous and trade costs are positive, countries will not be on both sides of the market, i.e. they will not export and import the same good. Thus, the most flows will obtain when there is one exporter and C -1 importers.
If there are more exporters of a good, then trade between them will be zero and the number of flows will tend to fall or at most remain the same. condition. This suggests that even at the 6-digit level, it would be a mistake to model more than a small fraction of world trade using a model in which perfectly competitive firms export homogeneous goods. However, if the vast majority of trade is in differentiated products and imported varieties are rising, then this implies that there may be gains from importing new varieties.
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To sum up, our examination of the raw data reveals several important features of globalization. First, in most countries, the trade to GDP ratio is rising not because they import more of the same varieties, but rather because they import new goods and, in particular, new varieties of existing goods. This phenomenon is critical for understanding the growth of trade relative to GDP around the world. Second, there appear to be vastly more bilateral flows between countries than one would have predicted using classic comparative advantage models. This implies that countries may have gains from the import of new varieties. How much the increase in new varieties matters for global growth is the issue we address in the next section.
7 Bilateral trade in homogeneous goods could occur in the Brander and Krugman [1983] model. However, in this model, an expansion of the number of trading partners would also produce a welfare gain because prices would fall.
III. Empirical Strategy

A. Theory
Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991] analyzed the impact of trade on growth in the context of an endogenous growth model. In this section we generalize that framework along the lines of Jones [1995] so that we can examine how international trade in intermediate goods affects domestic growth. For expositional ease, we first describe the environment in the home country and then introduce a foreign country. We start by assuming that final output is produced in the home country according to the following production function: 
We assume that the producers of capital goods rent designs of these goods for a price of r. Profit maximization by capital goods producers implies that they set 8 There are two important features of this production function. Prior work in the literature, e.g. Jones [1995] , has assumed final goods output is produced according to the following production function:
. We generalize this specification as it is hard to take to the data because  governs both the labor share of output and the degree of substitution among varieties. In addition, we follow the literature and do not distinguish capital from intermediate inputs.
The first order condition is given by (7) 0.
We can use (5) and (7) to obtain the profit maximizing price and quantity, which are given by the following expressions:
Equilibrium profits of capital input producers can be expressed as:
Equation (9) lets us simplify our final goods production function and derive a measure of total factor productivity (TFP). The capital stock in the economy can be defined as
Substituting equations (9) and (11) into equation (4) gives us our final goods production function:
(12)
We can then write the growth rate of TFP as
where variables with circumflexes denote log time differences. Expression (13) will facilitate the comparison of the model with the measurements of TFP growth we use in the empirical section.
A central component of endogenous growth models is the innovation function, i.e. the technology with which researchers use technology to produce new products. Jones [1995] postulates that this can be written as
where L A is the number of workers engaged in new intermediate designs and χ is a parameter relating to the effective share of the labor force engaged in R&D. In the formulations used by all fully-endogenous growth models prior to Jones [1995] ,  = 1. As a result, these models all had the counterfactual prediction that TFP growth rates should be rising in countries where R&D inputs are rising. The key insight of the Jones model is that if  < 1, this counterfactual prediction could be eliminated, and the long-run growth rate of TFP would not rise even if R&D exhibited a positive growth rate. We therefore allow, but do not require, that  < 1.
With these assumptions, we could now derive the return on capital and the prices charged for blueprints, but since these equations and derivations are identical to those in Jones [1995] and play no role in our empirical analysis, we will not present them here. Instead, to close the model, we assume the consumers maximize an additively separable representative utility function of the form
, subject to equations (12) and (14),
We are ready to characterize the balanced growth path. Along the balanced growth path, the growth rate of Â must be zero. This implies that the steady state growth rate of A must be
. Along this path we require that the capital to output ratio be stationary and
If we totally differentiate equation (12) and assume we are on the balanced growth path, we obtain
and hence per capita income, per capita consumption, and the capital to labor ratio grow at the rate given by the second term in equation (19). As is the case with semi-endogenous growth 9 See pages 781-3 in Jones [1995] . models, the long run growth rates are pinned down by the population growth rate and the growth rate of TFP.
One of the main results in Jones [1995] is that even permanent increases in the labor share of R&D or in the number of intermediate goods will not have a permanent effect on the growth rate of output. Nevertheless, these changes do affect the growth rate along a transition path to the new steady state. In order to understand these transitional growth dynamics, we log differentiate equation (12) to obtain
If we denote the investment share of output by i and the rate of depreciation of capital by d, we can rewrite this equation as
As in Jones [1995] we assume that both the R&D share of labor and the physical investment rate are constant and are given exogenously. This reduces the dimensionality of the problem and
simplifies the analysis.
To analyze the transition dynamics of the model it is useful to define z = Y/K. One can show that along the balanced growth path, equation (21) implies that z* = (n + d)/i, that is, the steady state output to capital ratio will equal (n + d)/i. In the next section we consider an experiment that perturbs the growth rate of new designs, x, and the capital to output ratio, z, from their steady state values. These variables will be constant in the steady state.
The evolution of the growth rate of per capita output in (21) can be expressed in terms of deviations from the steady state levels of the innovation rate and the capital to output ratio,
This equation is critical because it links how a shock that changes innovation rates and the output to capital ratio from their steady state values will translate into growth in income per capita.
In turn, we need to understand the evolution of innovation rates and the output to capital ratio following a shock to the system. We can rewrite equation (20) in order to obtain an equation of motion of the output to capital ratio around the steady state:
. Log differentiating this equation around the steady state gives us the equation of motion of the rate of variety creation
In order to understand the impact of new varieties on growth, we need to solve the system of differential equations given by equations (23) and (24). Unfortunately, equations (23) and (24) are nonlinear, but we can linearize them around the steady state. Solving the system of linear equations we can show that the laws of motion of the innovation rates and capital per output are described by the following equations
where 0 A and z 0 are the initial values of the innovation rate and capital to output ratio, respectively.
If we substitute these back into equation (22), we obtain:
which gives us the transitional dynamics for output growth. We will return to this equation in the next section.
B. Trade and Growth: A Simple Calibration
We are now ready to understand the impact of new imported varieties on growth.
Imagine that there are two symmetric autarkic economies in the steady state with A* varieties at 10 Define and
. The solution to this system is given by
e c e c
time t in each country. Assume further that a share, , of these varieties are tradable. The GDP, innovation, and growth rate equations (i.e., equations (12), (14), and (27)) provide us with a simple mechanism for tracing the impact of such a change in our model. If the countries open up to trade, the number of varieties in the home market will rise from A* to A*(1+) as the home country exports some of its varieties abroad in exchange for the new foreign varieties. This will have two effects. The first, which we call the "level effect," arises from the instantaneous impact that the new varieties will have on the level of GDP through equation (12). The level effect will cause a one-time rise in GDP equal to
in percentage terms. However, this liberalization will also affect the growth rate of per capita income through two channels. First, equation (14) tells us that an increase in A will cause the domestic rate of new variety creation to rise by a factor of (1+)  because R&D labor now has more varieties of capital goods to work with. In addition, the foreign rate of variety creation will also rise by the same amount since their researchers can use domestic varieties. Of these foreign varieties, a share  will be imported causing the rate of growth of varieties upon liberalization to
Second, the increase in new varieties will cause the output to capital ratio, z, to jump by the amount of the level effect. These two forces will cause future growth rates of per capita income to rise through equation (27).
Although we will estimate the relevant parameters later in the paper, one can obtain a feel for how the model operates through a simple exercise. Let's assume that only 10 percent of capital goods are tradable. In this case we would have  = 0.1. As in Jones [1995] , we assume that the steady state per capita income growth rate g* = 0.02; the rate of depreciation, d, is 0.05; the population growth rate, n, is 0.02; the labor share of income, , is 0.67; the income to capital ratio, i, is 0.30; and the real discount rate is 0.95. In addition we need two parameters that we estimate later:  and ; we set these equal to 0.71 and 0.68 respectively and will justify these choices in the empirical section.
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Opening to trade causes an immediate jump in per capita income equal to the level effect.
In our calibration, the increase in the number of imported varieties instantaneously raises GDP per capita by 1.3 percent due to the level effect described in equation (28), and this causes the GDP to capital ratio, z, to rise from its steady state value of 0.23 to 0.24. In addition, the new varieties mean that R&D labor is more productive and this causes the growth rate of the number of varieties to jump from 0.14 to 0.17. This in turn causes the per capita growth rate to jump from 2.0 percent to 3.7 percent. The evolution of the growth rate is portrayed in Figure 5 . As one can see, the high growth rate persists for several decades after the liberalization, and the half-life of the impact of liberalization is 14 years.
An important implication of semi-endogenous growth models, then, is that trade liberalization can have very substantial impacts on economic growth. As we move forward with the analysis, it will be useful to have a numerical metric of the growth effect. One simple method is to compute the impact of the growth effect on permanent income. In order to do this, we assume a discount rate of 0.95 and compute the present discounted value (PDV) of all income over the next 250 years of the economy that experienced an opening to trade, and then subtract the PDV of income if the economy had just had a per capita growth rate of 2 percent over this time period. We can then express this difference in terms of the initial level of income to obtain the impact of the increased growth rate on permanent income.
The results indicate that permanent income rises by 39 percent as a result of trade liberalization. Of this, only 1.3 percentage points are due to the level effect. In other words, semi-endogenous growth models suggest that there are very powerful growth effects due to trade liberalization that are ignored by conventional static analyses. Much of the impact from this exercise comes from the fact that trade liberalization not only gives access to new imported varieties today but also to new future imported varieties. Trade liberalization means that the R&D sector obtains access to the future stream of new foreign varieties which effectively doubles the rate of return on R&D labor after the liberalization both at home and abroad. Since both the home and foreign country benefit from this stream of future varieties, this feedback effect explains why we observe such powerful growth effects in this benchmark case.
We can also see what the impact of trade liberalization on growth would be if we shut down the access the country has to future varieties. Here the thought experiment would be a onetime increase in the number of imported varieties but no future increase in imported varieties.
The results from this exercise are portrayed in the plot without feedback effects. The growth rate now only jumps from 2 percent per year to 2.7 percent because the home country only benefits from the stock but not the flow of foreign varieties. While the level effect remains the same, the lower future growth rate means that permanent income only rises by 16 percent due to the trade liberalization. Still, the surprising part of the calculation is the large magnitude of the growth impact. Although the level effect only translates into an impact on growth of a few tenths of a percentage point per year, the persistence of this impact means that it has a substantial impact on permanent income. Since we are not certain about the permanence of trade liberalization, we will assume that countries do not benefit from the future flow of imported varieties when they liberalize. Thus, to the extent that these future flows of imported varieties are important, our results will tend to understate the gains from trade. This suggests that papers that focus on level effects, e.g. , may substantially understate the impact of trade on income because they do not address the growth effect.
C. Implementation
The theory outlined above cannot be applied to the data directly without two modifications: not all varieties are of identical quality and different types of inputs may have different elasticities of substitution. In order to do this we begin by assuming that there are G goods, denoted by x g , some of which are imported and some produced domestically. This implies that we can rewrite our production function as
where x g denotes the output of good g.
We next assume that each imported good is comprised of varieties, and that x g is a CES composite of differentiated varieties of a particular imported input. Since we will be working with sets of goods that are constantly changing, it will be more convenient to refer to the set of available goods in time t as I t and the set of varieties available of good g as I gt , with v denoting a variety in that set. We can therefore write each imported input as
where d gvt can be thought of as either the quality parameter for a particular variety or a monotonic transform of the number of sub-varieties within a variety.
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Given this structure, we can apply the same methodology as in Feenstra [1994] to measure TFP arising from new inputs, but now we are going to use the dual measure of TFP. We know that we can write output as Y t = E t /c(p t ,I t ), where E t is the total costs of production, and c is the unit cost function given that firms face input prices given by p t and the set of available inputs
Given the assumptions underlying equation (29), we can decompose output changes into the contribution of new and existing inputs:
Y Y E E c p I c p I E E c p I c p I c p I c p I
where I  I t  I t-1 is the set of the varieties that are common in the two time periods, and the last term of equation (31) (29) and (30), the ratio of unit costs in the first line of equation 
where we allow the elasticity of substitution to vary by sector in the data.
Equations (13) and (33) provide us with two ways of measuring TFP growth due to new varieties. If new varieties were the only factor driving TFP, these measures would be equal. We can easily see this in the simple case in which there is only one good. In this case,
Suppose the number of varieties simply expands from A 0 to A 1 . We can then rewrite equation (13) (33) reveals that this would produce the same measure of TFP.
A second important facet of these two measures of TFP is that they can provide a very useful means of understanding how varieties affect TFP. Equation ( 
IV. Econometrics
We rely closely on the methodology derived in Feenstra [1994] as extended by to estimate elasticities of substitution between varieties of imported goods. As opposed to the previous section, here we index each variable with a country subscript i to emphasize that elasticities are estimated separately for each good and importing country. 13 We estimate the following system of import demand and export supply equations:
13 After estimating the sigmas, we check for a strong good-specific component by pooling all countries' log sigmas and regressing on the average log sigmas by industry, following Broda, Limão, and Weinstein [2008] . We obtain a coefficient of unity and high levels of significance, with or without country fixed effects. Thus, even though the 
That is, once good-time specific effects are controlled for, demand and supply errors at the variety level are assumed to be uncorrelated.
To derive the key moment conditions that will be used for identification, it is convenient to multiply (34) and (35) together to take advantage of the independence condition of errors:
cannot be consistently estimated from (36) as the error term, igvt  , is correlated with the regressands that depend on prices and expenditure shares. However, it is still possible to obtain consistency by exploiting the panel nature of the dataset combined with the assumption that demand and supply elasticities are constant over varieties of the same good. The intuition is that the independence of the demand and supply shock terms enables us to use sigmas share a strong common component, in our estimation we allow for them to vary by country to capture the richer aspects of our data.
equation (36) 
To ensure we used a sufficiently tight grid, we cross-checked these grid-searched parameters with estimates obtained by non-linear least squares as well as those obtained through Feenstra's original methodology. Using our grid spacing, the difference between the parameters estimated using Feenstra's methodology and ours differed only by a few percent for those σ ig and ω ig for which we could apply Feenstra's "between" approach.
observed in the level of disaggregation of our data. These new sub-varieties would show up in the system as a positive demand shock, ivgt  . We classify each U.S. 6-digit category by the role that sub-varieties play in its growth, and estimate 4-digit supply elasticities using only the subsample of 6-digit varieties in which changes in sub-varieties were negligible. We then compare these estimates, where we expect the identifying assumption to hold, with the estimates obtained using all varieties. These tests are discussed in detail in Appendix II to Broda, Limão, and
Weinstein [2006] . The problem of measurement error in unit values motivates our weighting scheme. In particular, there is good reason to believe that unit values calculated based on large volumes are much better measured than those based on small volumes of imports. In the appendix of , they show that this requires us to add one additional term inversely related to the quantity of imports from the country and weight the data so that the variances are more sensitive to price movements based on large shipments than small ones. 15 The use of the between estimate coupled with our need to estimate  ig ,  ig , and a constant means that we need data from at least three exporting countries for each importer in each good and at least three two-time differences to identify ig  .
V. Results
We begin by characterizing the growth in world varieties in terms of our key parameters.
One of the problems that we face is the sheer number of goods and countries in our dataset. With 73 countries and most countries reporting close to 200 3-digit HS sectors, we constructed approximately 13,000  ratios and estimated an equal number of elasticities of substitution. It is obviously impossible to report all of these and far too much to hope that there won't be some outliers. One approach to assessing the reasonableness of these estimates is to compare them with existing estimates and our priors.
Given that our dataset incorporates countries with varying degrees of development, it is reasonable to worry about whether our methodology works for the typical country. In order to provide a sense of the distribution of elasticities of substitution, we computed the average and median values of each parameter for each country and then computed the distribution of these parameters across countries. The typical country has a median elasticity of 3.4, significantly 15 As in , we weight the data by
. The mathematics underlying this weighting scheme is given in the appendix to that paper. larger than that of the United States. Average 's tend to be higher than medians because the 's are bounded below by 1. After sorting countries by their average sigma, we find that the typical country has an average sigma of 6.8, while the US has an average sigma of 4.2, suggesting that on average the US tends to value variety somewhat more than the typical country. Another way of looking at the results is to focus on the results for the sub-samples of developed and developing countries. The bottom of Table 4 reveals that the median elasticity of substitution does not vary by the level of development. This indicates that there is no strong relationship between income per capita and the elasticity of substitution across countries. Not surprisingly, there are some outliers. The United States and Greece have somewhat low sigmas and Sweden and Canada have high sigmas. Overall the median elasticity of substitution shows a fair bit of dispersion, with the minimum median elasticity being 2.3, while the maximum is more than twice as large.
This, of course, raises the question of whether our elasticity estimates themselves are sensible. One approach to assessing their "reasonableness" is by comparing them with our priors.
We might suspect that varieties of goods traded on organized exchanges are likely to be more substitutable than those that are not. For example, natural gas exported by different countries is likely to be more similar than telecommunications equipment emanating from different suppliers.
Rauch [1999] classifies all 4-digit SITC product categories into 3 groups: those sold in organized exchanges, those that have a reference price in the US and the rest. Broadly speaking, the classification helps distinguish between products that are commodities and those that are differentiated. We obtain concordances between 3-digit HS codes and 4-digit SITC codes to group our estimates of elasticities of substitution into the groups distinguished by Rauch. Table 5 shows median and mean according to these different groups. In all cases, we can strongly reject the hypothesis that the median or mean for the group of commodity products is lower than that for the other two groups. In particular, the average elasticity is 12.1 for commodities while it is around 7.2 for the rest of the products. Thus, our elasticity estimates seem to be plausible by this criterion.
A second way of assessing the reasonability of our estimates is by looking at how stable our estimates are. We would like the estimate of the elasticity of substitution to be stable for a country. This might be violated if the elasticities are not measured precisely or if the elasticity of substitution changes with the number of varieties. If the elasticity of substitution rises with the number of varieties in the market (which in turn would imply that the markups would be falling), this would also imply that our assumption of CES preferences might generate systematic biases.
For example, if increasing the number of varieties from 1 to 2 does not yield the same proportional gain in productivity as increasing the number of varieties from 10 to 20, this would be a violation of the CES assumption.
There is a simple way to examine whether we face this problem in the data: examine whether elasticities fall as the number of varieties rises. If we estimate the elasticities separately for the first half of the sample (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) and the second half of the sample (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) , we can obtain two sets of elasticity estimates for each country that are each based on different data.
These elasticities can be thought of as "local" elasticities estimated in the two time periods. We can then use these two sets of estimates to examine the stability of our estimates. First, if one believed that rising numbers of varieties were associated with greater perceived substitutability, one would expect to see a rise in the typical elasticity of substitution over time. Since we observed a 40 percent rise in the number of varieties over this time period, there is scope for a significant impact. We do not observe this: the median elasticity of substitution estimated is 3.6 in both time periods. Similarly, the tenth and ninetieth percentiles of the distribution of elasticities move by less than 5 percent.
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The stability of the overall distribution of elasticity estimates could be masking important shifts in elasticities across industries or within countries. It would be disturbing if inputs that were highly substitutable in one time period were differentiated in the second period. Similarly, it could be the case that industries that experienced more rapid variety expansion saw their elasticities rise more rapidly than those of other industries. These two objections would call into question our underlying CES assumption.
If we regress the log of the later period estimates on the log of the earlier estimates and include good fixed effects, we can address these concerns directly. 17 In this specification, we can reject the hypothesis that elasticity estimates in the later period are uncorrelated with those in the early period at all conventional levels of significance (t-statistic = 6.2). Moreover, if we include the log change in the number of varieties in the two periods, the significance of the first term is unaffected and the significance of the coefficient on the change in the number of varieties is insignificant (t-statistic = -0.3). The R 2 of the "between" regression tells us the extent to which goods in countries where varieties are identified as more substitutable than the average in one period are also identified as more substitutable in the second period. The correlation between a sector's average log elasticity in the first period and that in the second is 0.7, and the R 2 obtained from regressing the later average elasticity estimate on the earlier one is 0.47. This tells us that not only does our methodology find that commodities are more substitutable than other goods, but our methodology also consistently identifies certain goods as more substitutable. We therefore conclude that our elasticity estimates are reasonable by a number of criteria: they conform to our prior that commodities are more substitutable than other goods, they are stable across time, and they seem unaffected by the number of varieties in the market.
We now turn to our measure of variety growth. There is, of course, substantial variation in median  ratios across countries, as one can see in Table 4 Using the intermediate input  ratios and elasticities of substitution for each good in each country we obtain an estimate of the productivity gains from new varieties (see equation (33) ).
The distribution of the TFP gains calculated on a per-year basis is also reported in Table 4 . 18 The growth in new varieties over the period 1994-2003 increased productivity by 1.3 percent in total or 0.14 percentage points per year in the typical country in our sample. There are a few implausibly large outliers in the results that are caused by very substantial increases in imported varieties coupled with very high import to GDP ratios -most notably Hong Kong -but for the most part the estimated productivity gains seem reasonable.
It is difficult to know from Table 4 whether our estimated level effects are plausible or not. Since we are arguing that the level effect should be a component of TFP, we can exploit the the fact that we have developed two TFP measures in order to assess the plausibility of our results. The first point to realize is that the primal measure of TFP (constructed using the formula following the second equal sign in equation (13)) makes no use of the number of varieties and can be thought of as the amount of growth that cannot be explained by factor accumulation. As such, it should capture all sources of productivity growth including imported varieties. By contrast, the dual measure of TFP defined in equation (33) In order to measure primal TFP, we rely on the data provided in the Penn World Tables v6.1 to compute TFP following the methodology outlined in Hall and Jones [1999] . 19 When we regress primal TFP on the level effect from varieties that affect TFP growth, but our estimates suggest that the level effects we identify are also systematically related to productivity growth in these countries.
We now turn to the magnitudes. The average and median impacts of the level effects of new varieties on productivity growth are presented in the first two rows of Table 6 . On average, new imported varieties raised productivity growth by 0.32 percent per year and the median impact was 0.14 percent per year. These numbers are both significantly different from zero. If we restrict ourselves to the sample of countries for which we can compute TFP from the Penn World Tables (13) implies that a one percent increase in the number of varieties will raise productivity by 0.14 percent ( = (1 -0.67)*(1 -0.706)/0.706 * 0.01) ). If we proxy the growth rate of "quality equivalent" varieties by the median  ratio, then this suggests that variety growth was 8 percent for the typical country, and therefore aggregate productivity should have risen by 1.1 percent between 1994 and 2003. This is not that far from the median impact of 1.48 percent that we obtain using the full set of 's and 's, which suggests that the key factor driving the magnitude of the level effect is the fact that we quality adjust the count of new varieties by using  ratios instead of a simple count of varieties.
We can also use the same formulas employed to construct the level effect to compute the unmeasured gain to consumers from greater consumption good availability. Here we use the  ratios computed using only consumption good imports and the share of imports of consumer 20 Because Hong Kong is the only economy with an import to GDP ratio in excess of one and therefore does not fit into our theory, we decided to drop it from our regressions. Including it causes the coefficient to fall to 0.97 (t-stat 1.6) R 2 = 0.05. If we simply drop the largest outliers, i.e. those countries whose level effects exceed 10 percent, the coefficient jumps to 3.8 (t-stat 2.3) R 2 = 0.10.
goods to GDP in our weighting variable to compute the impact that new varieties have on consumers. Since this variety effect is not captured in standard price indexes which are computed using common sets of goods, we can think of these as unmeasured gains to consumers from the availability of new imported foreign varieties of goods. The results are presented in the last column of Table 4 . The median unmeasured welfare gain of a consumer in our sample of countries was 0.63 percent overall and 0.4 percent in developed countries. These unmeasured gains are much smaller than the level effects largely because most imports are intermediate goods rather than consumption goods.
VI. Why are varieties rising? The Growth Effect
Thus far, we have been concerned with documenting that the import of new varieties is growing, that varieties are differentiated, and that this process has been exerting a non-trivial effect on productivity growth in developing countries. In this section we first test whether this is a feature of the data, and then use our estimated parameters to estimate the growth effect.
Our first challenge is to obtain a measure of the workforce engaged in innovation L A .
Reliable measures of this are hard to find across countries 21 . However, endogenous growth models suggest that in the steady state, L A should be proportional to the labor force. In RiveraBatiz and Romer's [1991] paper, the R&D input (F) is proportional to 2/3 1/3 L K . Since this has the added feature that wealthier countries, i.e. those with higher capital to labor ratios, are likely to have a higher share of labor in R&D, we adopt this specification here.
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Our second challenge is to obtain a good measure of the change in varieties. Ideally, we would have counts of all new varieties produced in a country. Unfortunately, we have no information about the number of non-traded varieties produced in any of our countries. However, if we make some reasonable assumptions, we can identify associations between the new domestic varieties that we cannot observe and the new exported varieties. There are two polar ways to link country observables with new exported varieties. One is to assume that all new products are exportable. In this case, the relevant measure of R&D input is the national value, and we can specify the right-hand side of equation (14) as it is written. A second approach is to 21 There is, however, a vast literature on the determinants of innovation at the firm level (see Klette and Kortum [2004] for a summary of the relevant stylized facts). 22 If we assume that F = L, we obtain a  equal to 0.9 which produces even greater growth effects than what we report.
assume that the amount of R&D in the tradable goods sector is equal to the fraction of the economy that is devoted to exports. In this "export specification" case, we should multiply F by the share of exports in the economy.
A second problem that we face implementing our test is that some countries in our sample export virtually every 6-digit good. Figure 6 plots the number of sectors with no exports against the level of exports in 1994. Clearly, the largest exporters already export in almost every product category and cannot substantially increase the number of new goods they export. For example, the US and Germany had positive exports in all but a couple of the 5,036 possible sectors. This means that it is almost impossible for us to measure the value of innovation in these economies.
Presumably, the reason why we cannot measure new variety creation in the US is not
because the possibility of innovation ended in 1994, but rather because we cannot measure the creation of a new good if it gets classified in a sector in which the US already exports. For example, many new technologies such as LCD monitors or laptop computers did not warrant their own categories at the start of our sample, but constitute new products nonetheless. We can get around this problem if we assume that innovation is equally likely to occur in any of the sectors but we can only measure innovation in a sector when a country is not exporting in that sector to begin with. In this case, for a common rate of innovation, we would expect to count more new exports emanating from a country that is exporting in very few sectors initially than in one that is exporting in many sectors. At the extremes, we would be able to observe every innovation in a country with no initial exports and no innovation in a country that exports in every category. In statistical terms, we can think of the number of sectors with no exports initially as the "exposure" of the country, i.e. how many possible times we can measure new goods.
Theory dictates that we should measure A  in equation (14) by the count of new exported varieties in a country over the sample period. This implies that we can estimate equation (14) using a negative binomial regression model. 23 The structural interpretation of the offset term in the negative binomial is that it corresponds to the differences in R&D quality in our sample of 23 A key assumption in standard Poisson regression models is that the variance of the distribution of counts equals the mean. In our sample, we have the common problem of over-dispersion, where the variance is higher than the mean. This implies that the negative binomial distribution is more appropriate for our application.
countries. Formally, we assume that variation in the quality of an R&D dollar spent in different countries can be modeled as a random effect,  i , and estimate:
where we make an adjustment for the exposure, T i , and a is the constant that governs the variance of R&D quality. Table 7 presents the estimates of equation (40). Our estimates of  (the coefficient on F)
are significantly greater than zero but smaller than one, which is predicted by the endogenous growth models but not the exogenous growth model. Clearly, our data supports the assumption that larger countries have higher rates of innovation. A more interesting result concerns the coefficient on TFP, . This parameter is significantly greater than zero but less than one: a result that is only predicted by the Jones [1995] model of semi-endogenous growth. Taken together, the results indicate that new variety creation rates are linked to endowment and productivity levels in a manner consistent with the semi-endogenous growth model.
We now turn to estimating the economic significance of the growth effect. In order to do this we repeat our earlier calibration exercise based on equation (27) lambda ratio for the country. We set  for each country equal to value implied by the median elasticity of substitution we estimate. Similarly, we set  equal to the level we estimate in the output specification of Table 7 . We assume that the movement in z is the same as the level effect computed in Table 4 . Finally, we set all of the remaining parameters equal to the values in our calibration exercise.
The results from this exercise are presented in Table 8 . Here we compute the impact that trade has on permanent income and the PDV of the level and growth effects for each country expressed as a percentage of that country's GDP. The median growth effect raises permanent income by 26.5 percent and the median impact overall is 28 percent. This effect differs substantially by income class. The magnitude of the impact for developed countries is much smaller than for developing. Among developed countries the typical growth and level effects were half as large as for developing countries. This reflects the fact that variety growth is much more important in developing countries.
VII. Conclusion
How much does trade matter for growth? This is not a question that can answered simply because trade regimes can vary enormously across countries and their impact may differ depending on a host of variables operative in the country carrying out reform. Rather than trying to answer a general, and perhaps not well-specified question, this paper has focused on quantifying one of the most important channels through which theorists believe trade affects growth. In particular, we estimate the impact that trade in new and better varieties has had on growth around the world. This is a central mechanism through which trade affects growth in many of the endogenous growth models and has never before been estimated. Moreover, rather than comparing aggregate measures of trade across goods or examining particular sectors in specific countries, we use a structure rich enough to allow for important differences across sectors and countries, but flexible enough to allow for simple aggregation over sectors. This enables us to quantify the impact that new imported varieties has had on the global economy.
Our results indicate that while there is a lot of heterogeneity in the impact of new varieties on productivity growth, the typical estimated impact of new imported varieties on TFP is 5 percent as large as productivity growth in the typical country and 14 percent as large as productivity growth in the typical developing country.
Secondly, we provide evidence that the rise in world varieties is consistent with the predictions of the semi-endogenous knowledge driven growth model, and is not consistent with exogenous growth models or the comparative statics of continuum of goods or monopolistic competition trade models. This indicates that not only do new varieties have substantial impacts on world productivity, but R&D is associated with increases in exported varieties in the way assumed by the theory. Although most of the impact of new varieties on growth arises through the level effect, we estimate that for the typical country in the world, the combined effect of new imported varieties between 1994 and 2003 will raise its permanent income by 28 percent. Most of this increase is achieved by small but persistent increases in the growth rate.
However, our estimates imply that these productivity gains are likely to have substantial growth effects on income. These growth effects result from small but persistent impact on the growth of countries that have access to new imported intermediates. The increased set of imported varieties available from 1994-2003 is estimated to increase the permanent income of the world by 17 percent by increasing future growth rates and innovation. These effects are likely not to be captured in standard empirical exercises that look at correlations between contemporaneous growth and openness or even lagged openness.
Nevertheless, we need to mention several limitations of our approach. First, although our modeling of economic structure in any individual market is vastly richer than what finds in the typical macroeconomic analysis, it falls short of the careful empirical studies that can be produced using micro data. For any of the thousands of markets that we consider in this paper, one could easily imagine more careful analyses of exactly how varieties affect welfare than the simple market structure we impose. Our decision not to take more care to model each of these sectors stems from a trade-off of feasibility versus efficiency. No doubt more can be said about the export supply of Gambian raw groundnuts than what we have produced in this paper, but we feel that the time necessary to do the careful analyses of markets and produce an estimate of the impact of trade on growth for more than a handful of countries makes that approach impractical for now.
Second, our close attention to the theory is both a strength and a weakness of this paper.
Endogenous growth models themselves employ highly stylized descriptions of consumption, production, and innovation that do not have firm foundations in microeconomic studies of consumer behavior or innovation. Leading macroeconomists have called for taking their models seriously and apply them to data, and we have tried to do so. However, one can have legitimate concerns about the underlying assumptions of the models themselves. In the future one can imagine developing richer models that better describe reality and better empirical methods that can take these models to the data. Nevertheless, we feel that much is learned by taking state of the art models to the data, and seeing how well they describe reality. We hope that is what we have accomplished here. Developing Countries (N = 51) Developing Countries (N = 34) 
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